MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE MIDDLE EAST — THE AMERICAN–ISRAELI SYSTEM OF WARFARE

Finally, it is possible to outline the position of the parties on the fifth day of March 2026.

The air forces of the United States and Israel, after a series of strikes, destroyed Iran’s command infrastructure and declared the regime successfully defeated. This is the first attack of such scale, showing — at least in comparison with the drowsy and quiet sanctions operations of previous years — that Washington and Tel Aviv are not inclined to risk their reputation or delay the demonstration of force. The military significance of the destroyed targets appears considerable on paper. However, the attacking side could have left them in its rear without risk — they do not determine the resilience of the adversary’s system. Command infrastructure by itself does not constitute the entire system, as demonstrated by the continuation of strikes against twenty-seven American bases in the region after the death of the supreme command. Let us be forgiven if we postpone a tactical assessment of this matter until more detailed information becomes available. For within the American command itself and in the Pentagon there prevails a blissful ignorance regarding the actual resilience of the Iranian system of command — Pentagon representatives admitted to members of Congress that Iran had not planned strikes against American forces if Israel had not attacked first, which undermines the very foundation of the operation.
For now we can only say that the continuation of strikes against bases in Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait and Jordan testifies to a stubborn, if not highly skillful, defense by Iranian structures and compels one to expect even more serious resistance from them. On the other hand, the destroyed objects do not represent any significant loss for Iran. For the American command, however, they will create many difficulties. What is it to do with this? It can neither consolidate the result without a ground presence nor retreat without loss of reputation, and it has nowhere to move except into a protracted conflict. Thus the consequences of victory have paralyzed the one who achieved it. And finally — how can the command, without landing forces, occupy and hold the space that has been struck? It can do so only by weakening its already overburdened fleet and air force, reducing resources in other directions.

This question has now provoked a very lively discussion in the American Congress — of course, as always, far too late.

The operation is commanded by Admiral Brad Cooper — the same one who in February had declared the strikes against the Houthis to be the largest naval operation since the Second World War, after which the Houthis continued to operate and the admiral received Iran. On Israel’s side the operation is directed by General Eyal Zamir — whose intelligence so successfully eliminated the entire enemy command that the enemy without command continues to strike twenty-seven bases in the region. Both men distinguished themselves by declarations of precise, overwhelming, crushing strikes — and both now observe how the consequences of those strikes are recalculated daily in the Situation Room, where the Secretary of Transportation has been invited just in case.
Suddenly Congress discovered that aviation and fleet, however powerful they may be, possess rather limited value if there are no forces capable of securing victory on land — for which airstrikes against ground targets alone are, even in the best case, far from sufficient. One gains the impression that this idea had never occurred either to the official leaders of the operation or to those who officially shape American public opinion. Congress has begun voting on a war-powers resolution to halt the operation — naturally, as always, when the troops are already fighting and the political rear begins to work against the military front.
Israel, for its part, is limping behind in the most miserable fashion as well. Its interceptor arsenals, which were supposed to provide protection for the entire duration of the operation, according to sources may be exhausted within several days if the current intensity of Iranian strikes continues. The magnificent Iron Dome, which was supposed to intercept everything, is in reality operating at its limits. And yet it would have been easy to dispense with theatrical declarations about the complete destruction of Iran’s potential and soberly assess that a strike without ground forces cannot consolidate its result.
The allied forces fraternize among themselves in their own way — Qatar has suspended flights, the UAE is introducing quarantine measures, and schools have been transferred to distance learning. Those allies who have remained intact by chance are occupied with calculating their own losses from strikes received under the American umbrella that did not protect them. If anyone required proof that neither the American nor the Israeli governments had a clear plan for the second day of the operation, it is enough to observe the position of the allies for this to become clear even to the blind.
Summarizing briefly the entire military situation, it may be confidently emphasized that the United States and Israel are compelled to maintain the operation simultaneously in several directions — Iranian strikes across the region, internal resistance in Congress, the depletion of arsenals, and the wavering of allies. As for Iran — it sacrifices command infrastructure and part of its controllability in order to draw the attacking side irreversibly into a protracted conflict without ground consolidation. As soon as a sufficient quantity of resources has been drawn into this theater — the southern arc will begin to operate against the one who set it in motion.

Author of the Article
Mark Orlov
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Release Date: March 4, 2026
Publisher: The Eastern Post, London-Paris, United Kingdom-France, 2026.